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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j), this case was originally filed in the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah. On April 18,2001, this case was assigned by the Supreme Court 
of Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in the case of Bradley v. Pavson Citv Corp.. 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah App. 2001), the 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Woods Cross City hereby incorporates by reference the Statement of Issues set forth 
in the Brief of the Appellant Golden Eagle Oil Refinery, Inc. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
This case is governed by the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408, and §§12-
22-101 through 106 of the Woods Cross City Municipal Code, a portion of the Woods Cross 
City Zoning Ordinance. These provisions are set forth in full in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case was instituted by Golden Eagle Oil Refinery as a Complaint for Injunctive 
and Declaratory Relief against Woods Cross City. Golden Eagle owns and operates an oil 
refinery within Woods Cross City. Golden Eagle's operations are a legal nonconforming use 
under the Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinances. Golden Eagle replaced 17 old storage tanks 
on its property with six new certified tanks. At the time the old tanks were disposed of, they 
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contained some material. From at least 1993 to the time when the tanks were disposed of, 
no material was put into or removed from the storage tanks. After replacing the tanks, 
Golden Eagle was advised by Woods Cross City that it needed appropriate land use 
approvals for the replacement of the tanks. Upon application, approval for replacement of 
the tanks was denied by the City. Golden Eagle instituted an action in the Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, Judge Memmott denied Golden Eagle's motion 
for summary judgment and granted the summary judgment motion of Woods Cross City. 
This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiff Golden Eagle Oil Refinery, Inc. ("Golden Eagle") operates an oil 
reclamation business at approximately 1474 West 1500 South, Woods Cross City, Davis 
County, State of Utah (hereinafter, the "Property"). Prior to 1991, the Property was operated 
as a used oil reclamation facility. R. App. at 226. 
2. In 1991, Woods Cross City changed the zoning of the Property from Heavy 
Industrial to Light Industrial. Under the regulations pertaining to this zoning district, Golden 
Eagle's operations are not permitted. However, subsequent to the zoning change, Golden 
Eagle has continued to operate on the Property as a legal nonconforming use. R. App. at 
226,227. 
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3. In 1993, Stan Hartmark and Merrill Maughan, the present owners of Golden 
Eagle, purchased the Property. R. App. at 227. 
4. Golden Eagle has a valid business license from the City for the operations it 
conducts on the Property. R. App. at 227. 
5. From 1993, when Stan Hartmark and Merrill Maughan, the present owners of 
Golden Eagle, purchased Golden Eagle, no new substances were delivered to or stored in the 
Old Tanks. Additionally, from 1993, none of the diesel sludge and/or water in the Old Tanks 
was used by Golden Eagle in its operations. R. App. at 132, 232. / 
6. Between May of 1998 and June of 1998, Golden Eagle drained and removed 
17 old storage tanks which had a combined capacity of 202,000 gallons. Sometime in May 
or early June of 1999, the old storage tanks ("Old Tanks") were replaced with six newer, 
certified API 650 tanks ("Certified Tanks") with a combined capacity of 116,000 gallons. 
These tanks were relocated to the center of the Property. Golden Eagle did not inform the 
City about the new tanks until after the City discovered that the new tanks had been delivered 
to the Property. R. App. at227. 
7. On June 10, 1999, Woods Cross City informed Golden Eagle that site plan 
approval from the City was required for the placement of the Certified Tanks. Golden Eagle 
submitted an application and corresponding fee on July 15, 1999. R. App. at 227. 
8. A hearing was held before the Woods Cross City Planning Commission on 
August 10, 1999. At that hearing, the Planning Commission unanimously agreed that the 
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changes by Golden Eagle created a more desirable situation and Golden Eagle should be 
allowed to install the Certified Tanks. Id. 
9. A hearing was scheduled before the Woods Cross City Council on October 6, 
1999. At that hearing, the Woods Cross City Council refused to approve the issuance of site 
plan approval for replacement of the Old Tanks with the Certified Tanks, finding that Golden 
Eagle had ceased to use the Old Tanks and that therefore that use could not be reinstalled as 
a nonconforming use on the Property. Furthermore, any attempts to replace the Old Tanks 
with the Certified Tanks would be considered by the City to be an expansion of Golden 
Eagle's nonconforming use. R. App. at 227, 228. 
10. On November 5,1999, Golden Eagle filed an appeal and statement of grounds 
with the City Council. On November 16,1999, the City Council informed Golden Eagle that 
its appeal was denied. R. App. at 228 
11. Plaintiff instituted this suit in the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Davis County on December 16,1999. Id. 
12. On October 17,2000, on cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, the District 
Court issued a Memorandum Decision denying Golden Eagle's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granting Woods Cross City's Motion. This appeal followed. R. App. at 226. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Golden Eagle operates its oil re-refinery in Woods Cross City as a legal 
nonconforming use. The City has never contended, or taken any position to suggest, that 
Golden Eagle's operations on the site must be discontinued. 
The District Court in this matter, as a matter of law, correctly determined that Golden 
Eagle ceased to use the Old Tanks on its Property for a period in excess of one year, and 
therefore abandoned the same. Further, under City ordinances, Golden Eagle is not permitted 
to replace Old Tanks or abandoned tanks with the new Certified Tanks. Installation of the 
new Certified Tanks would constitute an unlawful enlargement or expansion of Golden 
Eagle's nonconforming use on the site in violation of Woods Cross City ordinances. 
Additionally, Golden Eagle has argued that state regulations required it to replace the 
Old Tanks with the new Certified Tanks. This argument is not supported by the facts in the 
record. The record demonstrates that Golden Eagle was required to take some action to 
remedy deficiencies with the Old Tanks. However, nothing in state regulations required 
Golden Eagle to install the new Certified Tanks. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of 
the District Court in this matter is correct and should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED STATE LAW 
AND CITY ORDINANCES RELATING TO GOLDEN EAGLE'S 
REPLACEMENT OF STORAGE TANKS. 
It has been said that "the fundamental problem facing zoning is the inability to 
eliminate the nonconforming use." 4 E. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 22-14, at 99 (4th 
Ed. 1979). Although non-conforming uses are constitutionally protected from the retroactive 
effect of zoning regulations, such uses are not favored by the law, primarily because they 
detract from the effectiveness of comprehensive land use regulations, often resulting in lower 
property values and blight. Because of these negative effects, non-conforming uses should 
be eliminated or reduced to conformity as quickly as possible within the limits of fairness 
and justice. Accordingly, zoning provisions allowing non-conforming uses to continue 
should be strictly construed, and zoning provisions restricting non-conforming uses should 
be liberally construed. County Council v. E.L. Gardner. Inc., 443 A.2d 114, 118 (1982), 
Accord Rotter v. Coconino County. 818 P.2d 704 (Ariz. 199n: Hartley v. Citv of Colorado 
Springs. 764 P.2d 1216 (Colo. 1988); C&P Building Limited Partnership v. District of 
Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment. 442 A.2d 129 (DC Ct App. 1982); Berkev v. 
Kosciusko County Board of Zoning Appeals. 607 N.E.2d 730 (In. 1993); Bastian v. City of 
Twin Falls. 658 P.2d 978 (Id. 1983); Goodwin v. City of Kansas City. 766 P.2d 177 (Kan. 
1988); Oliver v. Citv of Rockland. 710 A.2d 905 (M.E. 1998); Citv University Park v. 
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Hagaman. 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972); City Council of Baltimore v. Dembo. Inc.. 719 A.2d 
1007(Md.Sp.App. 1998): Acton v. Jackson County. Mo.. 854 S.W.2d447 (Mo. 1993): City 
Lincoln v. Billy Bruce and Bettv. 375 N.W.2d 118 (Neb. 1985); New London Land Use 
Ass'n. v. New London Zoning Board of Adjustment. 543 A.2d 1385 (N.H. 1988); CG&T 
Corp. v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Wilmington. 411 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. App. 1992); 
Parks v. Board of County Commissioners. 501 P.2d 85 (Or. App. 1972); City of Myrtle 
Beach v. Juel P. Corp.. 522 S.E.2d 153 (S.C. App. 1999); Brown County v. Meidinger. 271 
N.W.2d 15 (S.D. 1978); Badger v. Town of Ferrisburgh. 712 A.2d911 (Vt. 1998); Citvof 
Chesapeake v. Gardner Enterprises. 482 S.E.2d 812 (Va. 1997); Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th. Inc. 
v. Snohomish County. 959 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1998); Essex Leasing. Inc. v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals of the Town of Essex. 539 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1988). Against this background, it is 
0 
clear that the arguments set forth in Plaintiffs Brief are simply incorrect. Further, it is clear 
that the District Court's decision in this matter properly construed state statutes and City 
ordinances relating to non-conforming uses. 
In its Brief, Golden Eagle argues that municipalities are required to make a choice 
relating to nonconforming uses: either (1) terminate all nonconforming uses by amortizing 
said uses; or (2) allow nonconforming uses to exist perpetually. This argument ignores 
fundamental rules of statutory construction and is contrary to the common law principles 
cited above and the statutory scheme established in this state. 
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The law of this state requires that statutory enactments are to be so construed as to 
render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful. Courts are to avoid interpretations which 
would render some part of a statute nonsensical or absurd. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 sets forth basic principles of law 
relating to nonconforming uses and reads, in part: 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use 
or structure may be continued. 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same 
building, provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or made 
for the purpose of the extension. 
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar 
energy device to a building is not a structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or 
amendment for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, 
alteration, expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms 
and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except 
billboards, by providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during 
which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the 
nonconforming use, if any; and 
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use 
by acquiring the billboard and associated property rights through: 
(0 gift; 
(ii) purchase; 
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(iii) agreement; 
(iv) exchange; or 
(v) eminent domain. 
Golden Eagle's construction of this section would render the provisions of subsection (2)(a) 
t 
completely meaningless. If municipalities are required to either amortize nonconforming 
uses or allow their perpetual existence, there is no need for cities to impose restrictions on 
nonconforming uses relating to restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration or expansion. 
Obviously, the law is not intended to be as restrictive as argued by Golden Eagle. While 
cities may, in fact, establish reasonable amortization periods for the termination of 
nonconforming uses, the law also allows for the termination of such uses through cessation 
of use or abandonment, and the eventual phasing out of nonconforming uses through 
obsolescence. Additionally, the law protects those uses which have been determined to be 
proper in the zoning district at issue from the expansion of the nonconforming use. Golden 
Eagle's argument would undo these fundamental principles of law and, therefore, cannot be 
accepted. 
State law also gives to cities the option to enact nonconforming use regulations which 
are more strict than those set forth in state statute. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-104 states: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), municipalities may enact 
ordinances imposing stricter requirements or higher standards than are 
required by this chapter. 
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(2) A municipality may not impose stricter requirements or higher 
standards than are required by: 
(a) Section 10-9-106; 
(b) Section 10-9-106.5; 
(c) Part 5, Residential Facilities for Elderly; and 
(d) Part 6, Residential Facilities for Persons with a Disability. 
Given the foregoing, the City is obviously authorized to enact nonconforming use regulations 
which are more strict than the Utah Code provisions. Accordingly, Golden Eagle's 
construction of relevant provisions of state law is simply incorrect. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT USE OF 
THE STORAGE TANKS CEASED FOR A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF 
ONE (1) YEAR. 
In this case the District Court determined that Golden Eagle's use of the old storage 
tanks ceased for a period in excess of one (1) year. This decision was based on Woods Cross 
City Ordinances and on the Court's legal interpretation of the term "in use." 
Section 12-22-106 of the Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance relates to the cessation 
of use of non-conforming uses. That Section, in part, states: 
A use shall be deemed to have ceased when it has been discontinued either 
temporarily or permanently for a period of one (1) year or more, whether or 
not with the intent to abandon said use, subject to the following provisions; 
(a) Cessation of Use of Building Designated or Designed for 
Nonconforming Use. Except for a residential or accessory farm structure, a 
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building or structure which was originally designed for a non-conforming use 
shall not be put to a non-conforming use again when such use has ceased for 
one (1) year or more. 
It is undisputed in this matter that from at least 1993, Golden Eagle put no new 
material into the storage tanks, nor did they remove any material from those tanks. 
Accordingly, the District Court determined that the old storage tanks were not in use for a 
period in excess of one (1) year. Significantly, during all of this time, Golden Eagle 
continuously used other storage tanks on the Property for storage of used oil products that 
were to be recycled by Golden Eagle. 
In support of its argument that the storage tanks were "in use" Golden Eagle asserts 
that the mere presence of any petroleum products in the storage tanks means the tanks were 
"in use." Golden Eagle argues that the storage of petroleum products is an essential and 
integral part of this business. Therefore, the presence of any material in the tanks necessarily 
leads to the conclusion that the tanks are "in use." In reviewing this argument, the District 
Court correctly noted that "the interpretation of "in use" offered by Golden Eagle would 
allow nonconforming tanks to exist perpetually, only because some form of petroleum 
products remains in them. This obviously is contrary to the stated purpose and objective of 
gradually eliminating nonconforming uses." R. App. at 235. The District Court's 
determination on this point is clearly supported by law and was rendered in accordance with 
the policy which underlies the law. 
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Golden Eagle argues that the District Court should adopt the definition of "in use" set 
forth in V-l Oil v. Dept. of Environ. Quality, 904 P.2d 214 (Utah App. 1995). However, as 
noted by the District Court: 
Where the Court recognizes that V-l Oil Company, identifies when an oil 
storage tank is "in use" for purposes of registration with the Department of 
Environmental Quality, Division of Environmental Response and Remediation 
(DERR), the Court does not necessarily find it conclusive in determining when 
an oil storage tank is in fact being used. The interpretation of "in use" offered 
by Golden Eagle would allow the nonconforming tanks to exist perpetually, 
solely because some form of petroleum product remains in them. This 
obviously is contrary to the stated purpose and objective of gradually 
eliminating nonconforming uses. 
R. App. at 234, 235. Golden Eagle's arguments are contrary to the policy which underlies 
the law of non-conforming uses. Therefore, the decision of the District Court was correct. 
Golden Eagle also argues that "under the City's interpretation, any legal 
nonconforming business would be required to rotate any stored inventory or materials at least 
once each year." (Brief of Appellant at p. 25). This argument is a ridiculous 
mischaracterization of the City's position. Nowhere has the City argued for the District 
Court or this Court to adopt a rule which would require inventories to be rotated. In this 
case, the District Court interpreted City ordinances relating to cessation of use and 
determined that, because Golden Eagle placed no material, nor removed any material from 
the old storage tanks at issue, and because there were no facts demonstrating that those tanks 
were in any way used as any part of Golden Eagle's refining or reprocessing operations from 
1993 to the present, the tanks were not "in use" for purposes of City ordinances. This 
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I 
conclusion, based on undisputed facts in the record, has no application to any of the other 
irrelevant scenarios proffered by Golden Eagle. The City is simply asking this Court to 
affirm the District Court's determination, clearly supported by undisputed facts in the record, 
that the Old Tanks which were replaced by Golden Eagle played no part in their operations 
from at least 1993 to the present date, and were not "in use." 
POINTIII 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT GOLDEN 
EAGLE'S REPLACEMENT OF THE STORAGE TANKS VIOLATES 
THE CITY'S NONCONFORMING USE ORDINANCE, 
Section 12-22-102 of the Woods Cross City Municipal Code states, in part: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, nothing in this Chapter shall prevent or 
discourage the strengthening or restoring to a safe condition or any part of any 
building or structure declared unsafe by proper authority. 
Additionally, § 12-22-104 of the Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance relates to the 
enlargement of nonconforming uses and states: 
A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended or changed unless the 
use is changed to a use permitted in the district in which it is located, and a 
nonconforming building shall not be reconstructed or structurally altered 
unless such alteration results in removing those conditions of the building 
which render it nonconforming except as follows: 
* * * 
(b) Repairs. Repairs and structural alterations necessary for building 
safety may be made to a nonconforming building provided that the floor area 
of such building is not increased. 
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(c) Within Building. A nonconforming use may be extended to 
include the entire floor area of the existing building in which it is conducted 
at the time the use became nonconforming. 
In the District Court, and on appeal, Golden Eagle argues that these provisions 
authorize the replacement of the Old Tanks with new tanks. The District Court determined 
that Golden Eagle's complete removal of the old storage tanks and replacement of new tanks 
is not in the nature of a simple repair or structural alteration as contemplated in subparagraph 
(b) or § 12-22-104. This decision is well supported. 
In Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc.. 179 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. App. 1944), the Court 
of Appeals of Kentucky reviewed a circumstance where the owner of a building housing a 
nonconforming use replaced decayed wooden walls with brick walls in the structure. In that 
matter, the court stated: 
The present use of a non-conforming building may be continued but it cannot 
be increased nor can it be extended indefinitely if zoning is to accomplish 
anything. It is customary for zoning ordinances to provide that the life of non-
conforming buildings cannot be increased by structural alterations when a 
change is made by the owner in the building he must make it conform to the 
ordinance. . . . It would not have been difficult for appellee to have made his 
plans comply with the milk requirement of the health department without 
replacing the wooden exterior walls of his plant with brick thereby converting 
it into a new and different structure. 
Selligman. 179 S.W.2d 207,209. 
Similarly, in Mossman v. Citv of Colombus. 449 N.W.2d 214 (Ne. 1989), the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska reviewed a situation where the owner of a nonconforming 
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mobile home was prohibited from replacing that mobile home with a new mobile home on 
the same site. In that case, the court stated: 
The relevant ordinances planned for the gradual elimination of the Mossmans' 
nonconforming use by permitting them to keep the original mobile home on 
their property until they decided to replace it. Therefore, the Mossmans lost 
their investment not as a direct result of the city's zoning ordinance but, rather, 
because the original mobile home had become shabby. 
Mossman, 449 N.W.2d 214, 218. 
These cases recognize the fundamental rule of nonconforming use law that structural 
alterations or repairs and certainly complete replacements are generally disallowed. This 
assists in achieving the desired objective: to assure that the use eventually will be phased out 
in favor of those uses deemed proper by the legislative authority enacting the zoning 
regulations. Golden Eagle's arguments would completely set this principle aside. 
Golden Eagle also argues that it was required to replace the Old Tanks by the Utah 
State Department of Environmental Quality. However, nothing in the record in any way 
supports Golden Eagle's assertion that it was required to replace the Old Tanks. It is clear 
from the material submitted by Golden Eagle that the Department of Environmental Quality 
required Golden Eagle, as part of the cleanup of the Property,1 to remove the Old Tanks or, 
at least, to prevent them from leaking and to construct appropriate secondary containment 
in the area of those tanks. However, the state did not require that Golden Eagle replace those 
lGolden Eagle was also required to remove numerous leaking barrels from the 
Property. R. App. at 3-5. 
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tanks. In fact, Golden Eagle could have complied with the state's requirements in every 
respect by simply removing the Old Tanks from the Property along with the old barrels. 
Nothing in the record supports Golden Eagle's assertion that the state required it to 
additionally replace the tanks that it removed. This sleight of hand in Golden Eagle's 
argument is a clear effort to make Golden Eagle's case appear much more sympathetic than 
it is. 
Golden Eagle cites cases from numerous other jurisdictions in support of this 
argument. However, in each and every case cited by Golden Eagle on this point, the federal 
or state regulation at issue required replacement or modernization of structures or facilities 
to continue the use. In this case, Golden Eagle has been operating without the use of the 
tanks at issue since at least 1993, the entire time that Mr. Hartmark and Mr. Maughan have 
owned the Property. The assertion that the state required Golden Eagle to install the new 
Certified Tanks is simply incorrect. Golden Eagle's operation continued on the site without 
the use of the Old Tanks for at least five (5) years prior to their removal and continues to this 
day. 
In truth, the installation of the Certified Tanks has nothing to do with regulations of 
the State Department of Environmental Quality and everything to do with current market 
conditions. Because of increased demand for re-recycled oil products, Golden Eagle wanted 
to increase its used oil storage capacity. Thus, the District Court's determination that 
installation of the Certified Tanks violates the City's nonconforming use law was absolutely 
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correct. If allowed to use those tanks, Golden Eagle's operations on the site will, in fact, 
expand. More importantly, the life of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use will be 
significantly extended, in contravention of the stated purpose and objective of 
nonconforming use law. Therefore, the decision of the District Court on this point should 
be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT GOLDEN 
EAGLE'S USE OF THE PROPERTY IS NOT TO BE PERMITTED AS 
AN ACCESSORY USE. 
Golden Eagle argues that its replacement of the Old Tanks is permitted as a valid 
accessory use to its primary nonconforming use on the Property. In support of this argument, 
Golden Eagle asserts that its use of the Certified Tanks is incidental to and subordinate to the 
nonconforming use of its Property. While Golden Eagle's use of the Certified Tanks may 
very well be incidental and subordinate to the primary use on the Property, a replacement of 
storage tanks which is prohibited by City Ordinances may not be allowed as an accessory 
use, particularly where the use Golden Eagle claims as an accessory has ceased for a period 
in excess of one (1) year, thereby prohibiting its resumption under the City's nonconforming 
use ordinances. 
In Gilchrist v. Town of Lake George Planning Board. 680 N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 3 1998), the Third Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reviewed a 
proposal to install a 2,000-gallon gasoline tank at a marina for the purpose of gasoline sales 
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to boaters. In that case, the petitioner argued that installation of the tank was an accessory 
use to its primary nonconforming use. The court declined to accept this argument. The court 
specifically noted that the tank proposed for installation would replace a tank which had not 
been used for a period of 15 years. The court noted that: 
Inasmuch as there has been no sale of gasoline in connection with the 
operation of the marina for at least 15 years, a period in excess of the one-year 
period specified in the zoning ordinance, (cite omitted), we conclude that the 
use was abandoned. (Cite omitted) 
Gilchrist 680 N.Y.S.2d 320,322. Similarly, in this case, the cessation of use, as determined 
by the District Court, prevents a finding that installation of the Certified Tanks constitutes 
an accessory use to the existing nonconforming use on the site. 
In support of its argument, Golden Eagle continues to assert that replacement of the 
Old Tanks was required by state law. However, as noted above, the record does not support 
Golden Eagle's assertion that it was required to replace the storage tanks. The record merely 
indicates that Golden Eagle was required to address the problems associated with the Old 
Tanks. Golden Eagle cannot bootstrap its replacement of the Old Tanks with the Certified 
Tanks by arguing that it is an accessory use. Again, such a practice would eat away at the 
purpose underlying nonconforming use law and would result in the perpetual existence of 
nonconforming uses in violation of the stated public policy of eliminating them. 
Golden Eagle argues that the District Court's holding on this point is erroneous 
because "the trial court determined that Golden Eagle's installation of the new tanks 
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increased its capacity on the site." Golden Eagle argues that facts do not support this 
conclusion. However, a review of the District Court's Memorandum and Decision clearly 
indicates that the trial court determined the tanks which were removed were never used in 
the processing operations on site, which finding is completely consistent with the undisputed 
facts presented to the Court. Therefore, because the replacement tanks now meet state 
regulations required for use in the refining process, Golden Eagle's capacity has, in fact, 
increased over that which existed prior to replacement of the storage tanks. Accordingly, the 
District Court's decision on this point is correct and Golden Eagle's assertion that it is 
actually decreasing storage capacity is completely disingenuous and, in fact, misleading. 
POINT V 
GOLDEN EAGLE'S REPLACEMENT OF THE STORAGE TANKS 
UNLAWFULLY ENLARGED AND EXTENDED ITS NONCONFORM-
ING USE. 
Golden Eagle argues that the District Court erred in holding that installation of the 
Certified Tanks acts as an enlargement of its nonconforming use of the Property. 
Section 12-22-104 of the Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance states, in part: 
A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or changed 
unless the use is changed to a use permitted in the district in which it is 
located, and a nonconforming building shall not be reconstructed or 
structurally altered unless such alteration results in removing those conditions 
of the building which render it nonconforming, except as follows: 
* * * 
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(b) Repairs. Repairs and structural alterations necessary for building 
safety may be made to a nonconforming building provided that the floor area 
of such building is not increased. 
(c) Within Building. A nonconforming use may be extended to 
include the entire floor area of the existing building in which it is conducted 
at the time the use became nonconforming. 
(d) Force Majeure. A nonconforming building or structure which 
is damaged or partially destroyed by fire, flood, wind, earthquake, or other 
calamity or act of nature or the public enemy, may be restored. 
However, the District Court's decision on this matter properly considered the undisputed 
facts relating to Golden Eagle's non-use of the Old Tanks and correctly applied the City's 
ordinances to determine that Golden Eagle's replacement of those tanks was improper. 
In Gilchrist v. Town of Lake George Planning Board, 680 N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 3 1998), cited above, the court stated: 
The installation of a new gasoline tank for the purpose of facilitating the sale 
of gasoline to the public would increase the volume and scope of the business 
of the marina as it has existed. It would replace an existing tank which has not 
been used for many years with a larger tank. In our view, this constitutes an 
expansion and enlargement of the original use of the property as a marina and 
violates the provisions of the zoning ordinance. 
Gilchrist 680 N.Y.S.2d 320,322. Similarly, in this case, Golden Eagle's installation of the 
Certified Tanks will increase the storage capacity of the plant from its previous capacity. 
Therefore, installation of the Certified Tanks represents an unlawful enlargement of the 
nonconforming use as determined by the District Court. 
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Golden Eagle cites case law from other states which indicates a replacement of the 
Old Tanks does not constitute an extension or enlargement of its use. However, Golden 
Eagle's argument completely fails to acknowledge the District Court's specific determination 
that Golden Eagle "permanently discontinued its use of the 17 Old Tanks, but not its 
nonconforming use of the property." R. App. at 237. Golden Eagle continually argues that 
the District Court's determination that its capacity on site increased through installation of 
the Certified Tanks is unsupported by any evidence in the record. However, the record very 
clearly demonstrates that, under the provisions of § 12-22-106 of the Woods Cross City 
Municipal Code, Golden Eagle completely ceased its use of the Old Tanks and, in fact, 
Golden Eagle's current owners never used the Old Tanks to store oil products for recycling. 
The District Court's determination that the Certified Tanks would add significant capacity 
to Golden Eagle's operations is fully supported by the undisputed facts in the record. 
The cases from other jurisdictions cited by Golden Eagle are readily distinguishable. 
In Gordon Paving v. Blaine County, 572 P.2d 164 (Id. 1977), the Idaho Supreme Court 
determined that the modifications at the plaintiffs plant did not result in an enlargement or 
extension of the use. However, the court specifically noted plaintiffs concession that the 
increased capacity of the plant resulted from greater efficiency of modernized equipment. 
In this case, the greater capacity at the plant results from new and additional structures, the 
new Certified Tanks. Again, it is critical to note at this point the District Court's specific 
determination, based on the undisputed facts in the record, that the Old Tanks which were 
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replaced ceased to be used. Therefore, the additional capacity of the new Certified Tanks 
does constitute an enlargement or extension, contrary to the situation presented in Gordon 
Paving. 
The situation presented in Keller v. City of Bellingham. 600 P.2d 1276 (Wa. 1979), 
is also significantly different from that presented in this case. In Keller, the court specifically 
held that: 
When an increase in volume or intensity of use is of such magnitude as to 
effect a fundamental change in a nonconforming use, courts may find the 
change to be prescribed by ordinance. (Cites omitted). Intensification is 
permissible, however, where the nature and character of the use is unchanged 
and substantially the same facilities are used. 
Keller. 600 P.2d 1276, 1279 (emphasis added). In this case, it is clear that significantly 
different facilities will be utilized. The new Certified Tanks will be put to a different use and 
are completely different structures than those which previously existed. Therefore, even 
under the rules set forth in Keller. Golden Eagle's replacement of the storage tanks does not 
constitute a permitted enlargement and extension of its nonconforming use. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Woods Cross City requests that the decision of the District 
Court be affirmed. 
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DATED this jf£_ day of May, 2001. 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
^ddJ. 
Attorneys for 
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ADDENDA 
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Chapter 12-22 PRIOR NON-CONFORMING USES 
12-22-101 Purpose and Objectives 
12-22-102 Continuing Existing Uses 
12-22-103 Construction Approved Prior to Enactment 
12-22-104 Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Extension 
12-22-105 Change of Use Not Allowed 
12-22-106 Cessation of Use 
12-22-101 Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this Section is to control and gradually 
eliminate those uses of land or buildings, which, although legal at 
the time of their establishment, do not now conform to the use, 
height, location, and similar regulations of the district within 
which they are situated. 
12-22-102 Continuing Existing Uses 
Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or 
structure, lawfully existing at the time of the enactment or 
subsequent amendment of this Ordinance, may be continued, even 
though such use, building, or structure does not conform with the 
provisions of this Ordinance for the district in which it is 
located. Except as otherwise provided by law, nothing in this 
Chapter shall prevent or discourage the strengthening or restoring 
to a safe condition or any part of any building or structure 
declared unsafe by proper authority. 
12-22-103 Construction Approved Prior to Enactment 
A building, structure, or part thereof which does not conform 
to the regulations for the district in which it is situated, but 
for which a building permit was issued and construction started 
prior to the enactment of this Title (or a substantially similar 
preceding provision), may be completed in accordance with such 
plans, provided work is prosecuted continuously and without delay. 
Such building shall be deemed to be nonconforming and shall be 
subject to the regulations set forth herein. 
12-22-104 Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Extension 
A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or 
changed unless the use is changed to a use permitted in the 
district in which it is located, and a nonconforming building shall 
not be reconstructed or structurally altered unless such alteration 
results in removing those conditions of the building which render 
it nonconforming, except as follows: 
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^(a) More Desirable. When authorized by the City Council in 
consideration of the prior recommendation of the Planning 
Commission, and in accordance with this Title, a nonconforming use 
which is determined to be of a more desirable nature may be 
substituted for another nonconforming use. 
(b) Repairs. Repairs and structural alterations necessary 
for building safety may be made to a nonconforming building 
provided that the floor area of such building is not increased. 
(c) Within Building. A nonconforming use may be extended to 
include the entire floor area of the existing building in which it 
is conducted at the time the use became nonconforming. 
(d) Force Majeure. A nonconforming building or structure 
which is damaged or partially destroyed by fire, flood, wind, 
earthquake, or other calamity or act of nature or the public enemy, 
may be restored. The occupancy or use of such building structure 
or part thereof which existed at the time of such partial 
destruction may be continued or resumed provided that such 
restoration is started within a period of 1 year and is diligently 
prosecuted to completion within a period of 2 years. In the event 
such damage or destruction exceeds 3 times the assessed value of 
such nonconforming building or structure, no repairs or 
reconstruction shall be made, except in the case of residences or 
accessory farm buildings, unless every portion of such building or 
structure is made to conform to all regulations for new buildings 
in the zone in which it is located, as determined by the Planning 
Director. 
12-22-105 Change of Use Not Allowed 
Whenever a nonconforming use has been changed to a conforming 
use, such a use shall not thereafter be changed or returned to a 
nonconforming use. 
12-22-106 Cessation of Use 
A use shall be deemed to have ceased when it has been 
discontinued either temporarily or permanently for a period of one 
year or more, whether or not with the intent to abandon said use, 
subject to the following provisions: 
(a) Cessation of Use of Building Designated or Designed for 
Nonconforming Use. Except for residential or accessory farm 
structure, a building or structure which was originally designed 
for a nonconforming use shall not be put to a nonconforming use 
again when such use has ceased for one year or more. 
(b) Cessation of use of Building Not Designed for 
Nonconforming Use. A building or structure which was not 
originally designed as a nonconforming use shall not be put to a 
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nonconforming use again when such use has ceased for 6 months or 
more. 
(c) Cessation of use of Nonconforming Use of Land. A 
nonconforming use of land not involving any building or structure 
(except minor structures such as fences, signs, and buildings less 
than 4 00 square feet in area) shall not be resumed when such uses 
has ceased for 3 months or more. 
(d) Cessation of Keeping of Nonconforming Animals. The 
keeping of nonconforming animals shall not be resumed when such use 
has ceased for one year. 
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UT Code § 10-9-408, Nonconforming uses 
Utah Code § 10-9-408 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 10. CITIES AND TOWNS 
CHAPTER 9. MUNICIPAL LAND 
USE DEVELOPMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT 
PART 4. ZONING 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 2000 General Sess. 
§ 10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and 
structures 
(l)(a) Except as provided in this section, a 
nonconforming use or structure may be 
continued. 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended 
through the same building, provided no 
structural alteration of the building is proposed 
or made for the purpose of the extension. 
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition 
of a solar energy device to a building is not a 
structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any 
zoning ordinance or amendment for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, 
reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, 
or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the 
terms and conditions set forth in the zoning 
ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, 
except billboards, by providing a formula 
establishing a reasonable time period during 
which the owner can recover or amortize the 
amount of his investment in the nonconforming 
use, if any; and 
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No 
and structures Page 1 
nonconforming use by acquiring the billboard 




(iv) exchange; or 
(v) eminent domain. 
(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard 
company from maintaining, repairing, or 
restoring a billboard structure damaged by 
casualty, act of God, or vandalism, the 
municipality's actions constitute initiation of 
acquisition by eminent domain under 
Subsection (2)(c)(v). 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a 
legislative body may remove a billboard without 
providing compensation if, after providing the 
owner with reasonable notice of proceedings 
and an opportunity for a hearing, the legislative 
body finds that: 
(a) the applicant for a permit intentionally 
made a false or misleading statement in his 
application; 
(b) the billboard is unsafe; 
(c) the billboard is in an unreasonable state of 
repair; or 
(d) the billboard has been abandoned for at 
least 12 months. 
*2940 (5) A municipality may terminate the 
nonconforming status of school district property 
when the property ceases to be used for school 
district purposes. 
As last amended by Chapter 286, Laws of Utah 1993. 
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